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Abstract
Self-tuning experience weighted attraction (EWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning
in games. It replaces the key parameters in an earlier model (EWA) with functions of
experience that “self-tune” over time. The theory was tested on seven diﬀerent games, and
compared to the earlier model and a one-parameter stochastic equilibrium theory. The more
parsimonious self-tuning EWA does as well as EWA in predicting behavior in new games,
and reliably better than an equilibrium benchmark. The economic value of a learning theory
is measured by how much more subjects would have earned in an experimental session if
they followed the theory’s recommendations. Economic values for several learning and
equilibrium theories were estimated (controlled for boomerang eﬀects of following a model’s
advice in one period, on future earnings). Most models have economic value. Self-tuning
EWA adds the most value.
1 Introduction
The power of equilibrium models of games comes from their ability to produce precise predic-
tions using only the structure of a game and assumptions about players’ rationality. Statistical
models of learning, on the other hand, often need data to calibrate free parameters, and use
a specific criterion (e.g., maximized likelihood) to judge the relative accuracy of models. The
calibrated models can then be used to generate predictions about behavior in new games. This
calibration-prediction process, while standard in econometrics, gives rise to two unresolved is-
sues for learning models: Specifying an accuracy or value criterion, and explaining apparent
cross-game variation in learning rules.
The first unresolved issue is how to judge the relative performance of learning theories.
Various criteria, such as mean squared deviation, hit rate, log-likelihood, and the value of
theories in terms of equivalent empirical observation (Alvin Roth et al., 2002) have been used
to measure predictive accuracy and show when models fit well and badly. These statistics are
useful. But Schelling (1960, p. 98) noted that, “a normative theory must produce strategies
that are at least as good as what people can do without them.” Schelling’s definition suggests
a new measure of the value of theories: The economic value of a theory is defined as how much
more (or less) players would earn if they use the theory to forecast what others will do, and
best-respond given that forecast, compared to how much they actually earn.
At first blush, economic value is simply a business person’s measure: It answers the question,
How much money is your theory worth? But economic value is also a measure of the degree of
disequilibrium, in economic terms. If players’ beliefs are not in equilibrium, then (by definition)
those players are misforecasting what others will do. A theory with more accurate beliefs will
have positive economic value (and an equilibrium theory can have negative economic value if it
misleads players). On the other hand, if players are in equilibrium, then an equilibrium theory
will advise them to make the same choices they would make anyway, and hence will have zero
economic value. A non-equilibrium theory which advises them to choose diﬀerently will have
negative economic value. So computing economic value can be seen as a novel way to evaluate
how close to equilibrium players are— in dollar terms. Economic value can also be interpreted
as the “fitness advantage” of theories, which is a useful input to evolutionary game theory.2
2In replicator dynamics models, the growth rate of organisms which use a strategy is proportional to the
diﬀerence between that strategy’s fitness (against the population average) and the population-weighted strategy
fitness (e.g., Weibull, 1995). If fitness is equated to experiment payoﬀ, this fitness advantage is exactly the same
The distinction between statistical accuracy and economic value is important because the-
ories which are statistically much more accurate than the implicit theories players use may not
add much economic value. And theories which are only small statistical improvements may be
very valuable (e.g., in high-stakes decision making or forecasting in large markets). This paper
computes both statistical accuracy and economic value and compares them.
The second unresolved issue is how to respond to cross-game variation in parameters of
learning theories. Some studies have shown that the best-fitting parameter values of learning
rules vary significantly across games and across subjects (see for example Yin-Wong Cheung
and Daniel Friedman, 1997 and Colin Camerer and Teck Ho, 1999; for a comprehensive review,
see Camerer, 2003). Some learning theorists regard parameter variation as a “disappointment”
(e.g., Guillaume Frechette, 2003, p. 42). We disagree and regard variation as a scientific
challenge rather than a disappointment.
One reaction to parameter variation across games is to abandon the search for a single rule
that predicts well across games, and instead build up a catalog of which rules fit in which games.
Rather than give up hope, we propose a general learning model which flexibly “self-tunes” the
parameters of our earlier EWA model across game, subjects, and time (inspired by self-tuning
control and Kalman filtering3). The model posits a single family of self-tuning functions which
can be applied to a wide variety of games. The functions are the same in all games, but the
interaction of game structure and experience will generate diﬀerent parameter values from the
functions, both across games and across time within a game. We find that the self-tuning
functions can reproduce parameter variation well enough that the model out-predicts models
which estimate separate parameters for diﬀerent games, in forecasting behavior in new games.
The model also addresses the concern that the earlier EWA model has too many parameters,
because it only has one free parameter that must be fixed a priori or estimated.
Self-tuning EWA also addresses the challenge of predicting behavior in a brand new game
as the economic value of a theory relative to the average subject’s implicit theory.
3Erev, Bereby-Meyer and Roth (1999) use a response sensitivity parameter which is “self-adjusting” in a
similar way. They divide the fixed parameter (λ in the notation below) by the average absolute deviation of
received payoﬀs from historically average payoﬀ. As a result, when equilibration occurs the payoﬀ variance shrinks
and the adjusted λ rises, which sharpens convergence to equilibrium. (This remedies a problem noted by Jasmina
Arifovic and John Ledyard, 2002— in games with many strategies learning models predict less convergence in
strategy frequencies than is observed.) Their model also has the interesting property that when the game changes
and received payoﬀs suddenly change, the adjusted λ rises, flattening the profile of choice probabilities which
causes players to “explore” their new environment more.
where we do not have prior data and hence must arbitrarily specify free parameters. Since
parameters self-adjust based on information feedback, they will “repair” poor initial estimates
and refine them so that the accuracy of the model will not deteriorate over time. The self-
tuning functions can also potentially do something that people do well— respond to changes in
structural parameters of games over time (like demand shocks or the entry of new players)—
which is something that models which estimate parameters from history do poorly.
Another interesting property of self-tuning EWA is that it can automatically transform
into familiar special cases in diﬀerent games, and at diﬀerent points of time in a game. One
key function is the decay rate φi(t), which weights previous experience. The self-tuning value
of φi(t) falls when another player’s behavior changes sharply (a kind of deliberate forgetting
resulting from change-detection). This change is like switching from a fictitious play belief
learning rule (which weights all past experience equally) to a more rapidly-adjusting Cournot
belief learning rule (which weights only the previous period). The change captures the idea
that if their opponents are suddenly behaving diﬀerently than in the past, players should ignore
their distant experience and concentrate only on what happened recently. (Albert Marcet and
Juan Pablo Nicolini, 2004, use a similar change-detection model to explain learning in repeated
monetary hyperinflations).
The second key function is the weight given to foregone payoﬀs, δij(t), in updating the
numerical attractions of strategies. This weight is one for strategies that yield better payoﬀs
than the payoﬀ a player actually received, and zero for strategies that yield worse than actual
payoﬀs. If players start out choosing bad strategies, then the weights on most alternative
strategies are 1, and the rule is approximately the same as belief learning (i.e., reinforcing all
strategies’ payoﬀs equally). But when players are in a strict pure-strategy equilibrium, all other
strategies have worse payoﬀs and so the rule is equivalent to choice reinforcement.
While the self-tuning EWA model is honed on data from several game experiments, it should
be of interest to economists of all sorts because learning is important for virtually every area
of economics. Much as in physical sciences, in the lab we can see clearly how various theories
perform in describing behavior (and giving valuable advice) before applying those theories
to more complex field applications. Since self-tuning EWA is designed to work across many
economic domains, sensible extensions of it could be applied to field settings such as evolution
of economic institutions (e.g., internet auctions or pricing), investors and policymakers learning
about equity market fluctuations or macroeconomic phenomena (as in Allan Timmerman, 1993,
or Marcet and Nicolini, 2004), and consumer choice (e.g., Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong, 2003).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the self-tuning EWA
model and its parametric precursor. In section 3 self-tuning EWA is used to fit and predict data
from seven experimental data sets. The hardest kind of prediction is to estimate free parameters
on one sample of games and predict play in a new game. Self-tuning EWA does well in this
kind of cross-game prediction. Section 4 estimates the economic value for the self-tuning EWA
model, three other learning models (EWA, weighted fictitious play, and reinforcement) and an
equilibrium benchmark (quantal response equilibrium). Many models have positive economic
value, and self-tuning EWA adds the most value. Section 6 concludes. An appendix shows how
to correct the economic value of a theory’s advice in period t for possible “boomerang” eﬀects
that advice can have on earnings from future periods (addressing the “Lucas critique” applied
to learning in games).
2 Self-tuning EWA
First, some notation is necessary. For player i, there are mi strategies, denoted s
j
i (the j-th
strategy for player i), which have initial attractions denoted Aji (0). Strategies actually chosen
by i in period t, and by all other players (who are denoted −i) are si(t) and s−i(t) respectively.
Player i’s ex-post payoﬀ of choosing strategy sji in time t is πi(s
j
i , s−i(t)) and the actual payoﬀ
received is πi(si(t), s−i(t)) ≡ πi(t).
For player i, strategy j has a numerical attraction Aji (t) after updating from period t expe-
rience. Aji (0) are initial attractions before the game starts. Attractions determine choice prob-
abilities in period t+1 through a logistic stochastic response function, P ji (t+1) =
e
λ·Aj
i
(t)Pmi
k=1
e
λ·Ak
i
(t)
,
where λ is the response sensitivity. Note that λ = 0 is random response and λ = ∞ is best-
response.
In the parametric EWA model, attractions are updated by
Aji (t) =
φ ·N(t− 1) ·Aji (t− 1) + [δ + (1− δ) · I(sji , si(t))] · πi(sji , s−i(t))
N(t− 1) · φ · (1− κ) + 1 (2.1)
where I(x, y) is an indicator function (equal to zero if x 6= y and one if x = y) (see Camerer
and Ho, 1999). That is, previous attractions are multiplied by an experience weight N(t− 1),
decayed by a weight φ, incremented by either the payoﬀ received (when I(sji , si(t)) = 1) or by
δ times the foregone payoﬀ (when I(sji , si(t)) = 0), and pseudo-normalized.
EWA is a hybrid of the central features of reinforcement and fictitious play (belief learning)
models. This hybrid is useful if actual learning mixes components of those simpler rules. A
hybrid is also useful for evaluating the statistical and economic advantages of complicating the
simpler models by adding components (and, consequently, for finding out when simple rules are
adequate approximations and when they are not).
Standard reinforcement models assume that only actual choices are reinforced (i.e., δ = 0).4
When δ = 0 and κ = 1 the rule is like the cumulative reinforcement model of Roth and Erev
(1995). When δ = 0 and κ = 0 it is like the averaging reinforcement model of Erev and Roth
(1998). A central insight from the EWA formulation is that weighted fictitious play belief
learning is exactly the same as a generalization of reinforcement in which all foregone payoﬀs
are reinforced by a weight δ = 1 (when κ = 0).5 Intuitively, the EWA form allows both the
stronger focus on payoﬀs that are actually received, as in reinforcement (i.e., δ < 1) and the
idea that foregone payoﬀs usually aﬀect learning when they are known, as in fictitious play (i.e.,
δ > 0).
For parsimony, we set κ = 0 and N(0) = 1 in self-tuning EWA.6 Initial attractions Aji (0)
are determined by a “cognitive hierarchy” model of reasoning (with parameter τ = 1.5; see
Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003, 2004).7
4See Calvin Harley (1981), Roth and Erev (1995), Sarin and Vahid (2001) (cf. Richard Bush and Frederick
Mosteller, 1955; John Cross, 1983; Patrick McAllister, 1991; Brian Arthur, 1991). Choice reinforcement is most
sensible when players do not know the foregone payoﬀs of unchosen strategies. However, several studies show that
providing foregone payoﬀ information aﬀects learning (See Dilip Mookerjhee and Barry Sopher (1994), Amnon
Rapoport and Erev (1998), and John Van Huyck, Ray Battalio and Frederick Rankin (1996)), which suggests
that players do not simply reinforce chosen strategies. Rajiv Sarin and Farshid Vahid, 2003, show that “spilling”
over payoﬀ reinforcement to neighboring strategies can explain the rapid pace of learning in the Van Huyck et
al. (1996) game.
5See also Cheung and Friedman, 1997, pp. 54-55; Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, 1998, pp. 1084-1085;
Ed Hopkins, 2002.
6We set κ = 1 because it does not seem to aﬀect fit much (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho, Xin Wang, and
Camerer, 2003). N(0) was included in the original EWA so that Bayesian learning models are nested as a special
case— N(0) represents the strength of prior beliefs. It is fixed to one here because its influence frequently fades
rapidly as an experiment progresses.
7There are at least three other ways to pin down the initial attractions Aji (0). You can either use the
first-period data to “burn-in” the attractions, assume all initial attractions are equal (which leads to uniformly-
distributed first-period choices), or use a decision rule like assuming that players best-respond to a uniform
distribution. The cognitive hierarchy approach uses a specific mixture of the latter two rules but adds further
steps of iterated thinking in a precise way. Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta
(2001) explore richer reasoning-step models.
These simplifications leave three free parameters— φ, δ, and λ. To make the model simple
to estimate statistically, and self-tuning, the parameters φ and δ are replaced by deterministic
functions φi(t) and δij(t) of player i’s experience with strategy j, up to period t. These func-
tions determine numerical parameter values for each player, strategy, and period, which are
then plugged into the EWA updating equation above to determine attractions in each period.
Updated attractions determine choice probabilities according to the logit rule, given a value of
λ. Standard maximum-likelihood methods for optimizing fit can then be used to find which λ
fits best.8
2.1 The change-detector function φi(t)
The decay rate φ which weights lagged attractions is sometimes called “forgetting” (an interpre-
tation which is carried over from reinforcement models of animal learning). While forgetting
obviously does occur, the more interesting variation in φi(t) across games, and across time
within a game, is a player’s perception of how quickly the learning environment is changing.
The function φi(t) should therefore “detect change”. When a player sense that other players
are changing, a self-tuning φi(t) should dip down, putting less weight on distant experience. As
in physical change detectors (e.g., security systems or smoke alarms), the challenge is to detect
change when it is really occurring, but not falsely mistake small fluctuations for real changes
too often.
The core of the φi(t) change-detector function is a “surprise index”, which is the diﬀerence
between other players’ recent strategies and their strategies in previous periods. To make
exposition easier, we describe the function for games with pure-strategy equilibria (it is suitably
modified for games with mixed equilibria, as noted below). First define a history vector, across
the other players’ strategies k, which records the historical frequencies (including the last period
t) of the choices by other players. The vector element hki (t) is
Pt
τ=1
I(sk−i,s−i(τ))
t .
9 The recent
‘history’ rki (t) is a vector of 0’s and 1’s which has a one for strategy s
k
−i = s−i(t) and 0’s for
all other strategies sk−i (i.e., r
k
i (t) = I(s
k
−i, s−i(t))). The surprise index Si(t) simply sums up
8If one is interested only in the hit rate— the frequency with which the predicted choice is the same as what a
player actually picked— then it is not necessary to estimate λ. The strategy that has the highest attraction will
be the predicted choice. The response sensitivity λ only dictates how frequently the highest-attraction choice is
actually picked, which is irrelevant if the statistical criterion is hit rate.
9Note that if there is more than one other player, and the distinct choices by diﬀerent other player’s matter
to player i, then the vector is an n− 1- dimensional matrix if there are n players.
the squared deviations between the cumulative history vector hki (t) and the immediate recent
history vector rki (t); that is,
Si(t) =
m−iX
k=1
(hki (t)− rki (t))2. (2.2)
Note that this surprise index varies from zero (when the last strategy the other player chose
is the one they have always chosen before) to two (when the other player chose a particular
strategy ‘forever’ and suddenly switches to something brand new). The change-detecting decay
rate is:
φi(t) = 1−
1
2
· Si(t). (2.3)
Because Si(t) is between zero and two, φ is always (weakly) between one and zero.
The numerical boundary cases illuminate intuition: If the other player chooses the strategy
she has always chosen before, then Si(t) = 0 (player i is not surprised) and φi(t) = 1 (player
i does not decay the lagged attraction at all, since what other players did throughout is infor-
mative). If the other player chooses a new strategy which was never chosen before in a very
long run of history, Si(t) = 2 and φi(t) = 0 (player i decays the lagged attraction completely
and ‘starts over’). Note that since the observed behavior in period t is included in the history
hki (t), φi(t) will typically not dip to zero. For example, if a player chose the same strategy for
each of nine periods and a new strategy in period 10, then Si(t) = (.9− 0)2+ (1− .1)2 = 2 · .81
and φi(t) = 1− .5(2 · .81) = .19.
In games with mixed equilibria (and no pure equilibria), a player should expect other players’
strategies to vary. Therefore, if the game has a mixed equilibrium with W strategies which are
played with positive probability, the surprise index defines recent history over a window of the
last W periods (e.g., in a game with four strategies that are played in equilibrium, W = 4).
Then rki (t) =
Pm−i
k=1 [
Pt
τ=t−W+1 I(s
k
−i,s−i(τ))
W ].
A sensible property of Si(t) is that the surprisingness of a new choice should depend not
only on how often the new choice has been chosen before, but also on how how variable previous
choices have been. Incorporating this property requires φi(t) to be larger when there is more
dispersion in previous choices, which is guaranteed by squaring the deviations between current
and previous history. (Summing absolute deviations between ri(t) and hi(t), for example, would
not have this property.) If previously observed relative frequencies of strategy k are denoted fk,
and the recent strategy is h, then the surprise index is (1− fh)2 +
P
k 6=h(fk − 0)2. Holding fh
constant, this index is minimized when all frequencies fk with k 6= h are equal. In the equal-fk
case, the surprise index is Si(t) = (m−i − 1)/m−i and φi(t) = (m−i + 1)/2m−i, which has a
lower bound of .5 in games with large m−i (many strategies).
The opposite case is when an opponent has previously chosen a single strategy in every
period, and suddenly switches to a new strategy. In that case, φi(t) is 2t−1t2 . This expression
declines gracefully toward zero as the string of identical choices up to period t grows longer.
(For t = 2, 3, 5 and 10 the φi(t) values are .75, .56, .36, and .19.) The fact that the φ values
decline with t expresses the principle that a new choice is bigger surprise (and should have an
associated lower φ) if it follows a longer string of identical choices which are diﬀerent from the
surprising new choice. It also embodies the idea that dipping φi(t) too low is a mistake which
should be avoided because it erases the history embodied in the lagged attraction. So φi(t)
only dips low when opponents have been reliably choosing one strategy for a very long time,
and then switch to a new one.
Another interesting special case is when unique strategies have been played in every period
up to t − 1, and another unique strategy is played in period t. (This is often true in games
with large strategy spaces.) Then φi(t) = .5+ 12t , which starts at .75 and asymptotes at .5 as t
increases.
In the first few periods of a game, φi(t) will not dip much below one (because the t-th period
experience is included in the recent history ri(t) vector and also folded into the cumulative
history hi(t)). But in these periods players often learn rapidly. Since it makes sense to start
with a low value of φi(0) to express players’ responsiveness in the first few periods, in the
empirical implementation we smooth the φi(t) function by starting at 0.5, and gently blending
in the updated values according to φˆi(t) ≡ .5/t+ (t− 1)φi(t)/t.
2.2 The attention function, δij(t)
The parameter δ is the weight on foregone payoﬀs. Presumably this is tied to the attention
subjects pay to alternative payoﬀs, ex-post. Subjects who have limited attention are likely
to focus on strategies that would have given higher payoﬀs than what was actually received,
because these strategies present missed opportunities (cf. Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Collel
(2001), who show that such a regret-driven rule converges to correlated equilibrium.) To capture
this property, define10
δij(t) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if πi(s
j
i , s−i(t)) > πi(t),
0 otherwise.
(2.4)
That is, subjects reinforce chosen strategies (where the top inequality necessarily binds) and
all unchosen strategies with better payoﬀs (where the inequality is strict) with a weight of one.
They reinforce unchosen strategies with equal or worse payoﬀs by zero.
Note that this δij(t) can transform the self-tuning rule into special cases over time. If
subjects are strictly best-responding (ex post), then no other strategies have a higher ex-post
payoﬀ so δij(t) = 0 for all strategies j which were not chosen, which reduces the model to
choice reinforcement. However if they always choose the worst strategy, then δij(t) = 1, which
corresponds to weighted fictitious play. If subjects neither choose the best nor the worst strategy,
the updating scheme will push them (probabilistically) towards those strategies that yield better
payoﬀs, as is both characteristic of human learning and normatively sensible.
The updating rule is a natural way to formalize and extend the “learning direction” theory of
Selten and Stoecker (1986). Their theory consists of an appealing property of learning: Subject
move in the direction of ex-post best-response. Broad applicability of the theory has been
hindered by defining ‘direction’ only in terms of numerical properties of ordered strategies (e.g.,
choosing ‘higher prices’ if the ex-post best response is a higher price than the chosen price).
The self-tuning δij(t) defines the ‘direction’ of learning set-theoretically, as shifting probability
toward the set of strategies with higher payoﬀs than the chosen ones.
The self-tuning δij(t) also creates the “exploration-exploitation” shift in machine learning
(familiar to economists from multi-armed bandit problems). In low-information environments,
it makes sense to explore a wide range of strategies, then gradually lock in to a choice with a good
historical relative payoﬀs. In self-tuning EWA, if subjects start out with a poor choice, many
unchosen strategies will be reinforced by their (higher) foregone payoﬀs, which shifts choice
probability to those choices and captures why subjects “explore”. As equilibration occurs, only
the chosen strategy will be reinforced, thereby producing an “exploitation” or “lock-in” (cf.
10In games with unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, we use δij(t) = 1W if πi(s
j
i , s−i(t)) ≥ πi(t) and 0 otherwise.
This modification is driven by the empirical observation that estimated δ’s are often close to zero in mixed games
(which might also be due to misspecified heterogeneity, see Nathaniel Wilcox 2003). Using only δij(t) without
this adjustment produces slightly worse fits in the two mixed-equilibrium games examined below where the
adjustment matters (patent-rate games the Mookerjhee-Sopher games).
Erev et al., 1999). This is behaviorally very plausible. The updating scheme also helps to
detect any change in environment. If a previously optimal response becomes inferior because
of an exogenous change, other strategies will have higher ex-post payoﬀs, which trigger higher
δij(t) values (and reinforcement of superior payoﬀs), which guides players to re-explore better
strategies.
The self-tuning δij(t) function can also be seen as a reasonable all-purpose rule which con-
serves a scarce cognitive resource— attention. The hybrid EWA model showed that weighted
fictitious play is equivalent to generalized reinforcement in which all strategies are reinforced.
But reinforcing many strategies takes attention. As equilibration occurs, the set of strategies
which receive positive δij(t) weights shrinks so attention is conserved when spreading attention
widely is no longer useful. When an opponent’s play changes suddenly, the self-tuning φi(t)
value drops. This change reduces attractions (since lagged attractions are strongly decayed)
which spreads choice probability over a wider range of strategies due to the logit response rule.
This implies that the strategy which happens to be chosen may no longer be optimal, which
re-allocates δij(t) attention over a wider range of better-responses. Thus, the self-tuning system
can be seen as procedurally rational (in Herbert Simon’s language) because it follows a precise
algorithm and is designed to express the basic features of how people learn— by exploring a wide
range of options, locking in when a good strategy is found, but reevaluating when environmental
change demands reallocation of attention.
A theorist’s instinct is to derive conditions under which flexible learning rules choose para-
meters optimally, which is certainly a direction to explore in future research (cf. Dana Heller
and Sarin, 2000; Jens Josephson, 2001). However, broadly-optimal rules will likely depend on
the set of games an all-purpose learning agent encounters, and also may depend sensitively
on how cognitive costs are specified (and should also jibe with data on the details of neural
mechanisms, which are not yet well-understood). So it is unlikely that a universally optimal
rule will be found that can always beat rules which adapt locally.
Our approach is more like exploratory work in machine learning. Machine learning theorists
try to develop robust heuristic algorithms which learn eﬀectively in a wide variety of low-
information environments (see Sutton and Barto 1998). Good machine learning rules are not
provably optimal but perform well on tricky test cases and natural problems like those which
good computerized robots need to perform (navigating around obstacles, hill-climbing on rugged
landscapes, diﬃcult pattern recognition, and so forth).
Before proceeding to estimation, it is useful to summarize some of the properties of a self-
tuning model. First, the use of simple fictitious play and reinforcement theories in empirical
analysis are often justified by the fact that they have few free parameters. The self-tuning
EWA is useful by this criterion as well because it requires estimating only one parameter, λ
(which is diﬃcult to do without in empirical work). Second, the functions in self-tuning EWA
naturally vary across time, people, games, and strategies. The potential advantage of this
flexibility is that the model can predict across new games better than parametric methods.
Whether this advantage is realized will be examined below. Third, the self-tuning parameters
can endogenously shift across rules. Early in a game, where opponent choices are varying a lot
and players are likely to make ex-post mistakes, the model automatically generates low values
of φi(t) and high δij(t) weights— it resembles Cournot belief learning. As equilibration occurs
and behavior of other players stabilizes, φi(t) rises and δij(t) falls— it resembles reinforcement
learning. The model therefore keeps a short window of history (low φ) and pays a lot of
attention (high δ) when it should, early in a game, and conserves those cognitive resources
by remembering more (high φ) and attending to fewer foregone strategies (low δ) when it can
aﬀord to, as equilibration occurs.
3 Self-tuning EWA predictions within and across games
In this section we compare in-sample fit and out-of-sample predictive accuracy of self-tuning
EWA, its predecessor (EWA) where parameters are freely estimated, and the one-parameter
Quantal Response Equilibrium model benchmark (Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey,
1995).11 The goal is to see whether self-tuning EWA functions can produce game-specific
parameters which are similar to values estimated separately in diﬀerent games. In addition, we
use a jackknife approach by estimating a common set of parameters on n − 1 of the n games
and use the estimated parameters to predict choices in the remaining game, to judge how well
models predict across games (cf. Erev and Roth, 1998).
We use seven games: Two matrix games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium (Dilip
Mookerjhee and Barry Sopher, 1997); R&D patent race games (Amnon Rapoport and Wilfred
Amaldoss, 2000); a median-action order statistic coordination game with several players (John
Van Huyck, Ray Battalio, and Richard Beil, 1990); a continental-divide coordination game,
11Our working paper also reports fit statistics and estimates from belief learning and reinforcement models.
in which convergence behavior is extremely sensitive to initial conditions (Van Huyck, Joseph
Cook, and Battalio, 1997); a coordination game in which players choose whether to enter a large
or small market (Amaldoss and Ho, 2001); dominance-solvable p-beauty contests (Ho, Camerer,
and Keith Weigelt, 1998); and a price matching game called traveler’s dilemma (Monica Capra,
Jacob Goeree, Rosario Gomez and Charles Holt, 1999).
Table 1 summarizes features of these games and the data. Three of the games are described
in detail below.12 Many diﬀerent games are studied because a main goal is to see how well
self-tuning EWA can explain cross-game variation. Sampling widely is also a good way to test
robustness of any model of learning or equilibrium. Models that are customized to explain
one game are insightful, but not as useful as games which explain disparate patterns with one
general model (see Roth and Erev, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001).
3.1 Estimation method
Consider a game where N subjects play T rounds. For a given player i, the likelihood function
of observing a choice history of {si(1), si(2), . . . , si(T − 1), si(T )} is given by:
ΠTt=1P
si(t)
i (t|λ) (3.1)
The joint likelihood function L(λ) of observing all players’ choice is given by
L(λ) = ΠNi {ΠTt=1P si(t)i (t|λ)} (3.2)
To determine the predicted probabilities P
si(t)
i (t|λ), we start with initial attractions Aji (0)
(which are the same for all i) determined by the predictions of the cognitive hierarchy model
(Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003, 2004) using τ = 1.5.13 After each period, the functions φi(t)
12The other four games are: Mixed-equilibrium games studied by Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997) which have
four or six strategies, one of which is weakly-dominated; the nine-player median-action game studied by Van
Huyck et al. (1990), in which players choose integer strategies 1-7 and earn payoﬀs increasing linearly in the
group median and decreasing linearly in the squared deviation from the median; a traveler’s dilemma game
(Capra et al., 1999) in which players choose numbers from 80 to 200 and each player receives the a payoﬀ equal
to the minimum of the chosen numbers and the player who chose the low number receives a bonus of R from
the player who chose the high number; and a coordination game (Amaldoss and Ho, 2001) in which n players
simultaneously enter a large or small market and earn 2n (n) divided by the number of entrants if they enter the
large (small) market.
13In the games we study, for example, one-step behavior predicts choices of 35 in beauty contests, 7 in
continental-divide games, 4 in median-action games, the large pot in entry-choice games, 5 and 4 in patent-
race games for strong and weak players, and 200− 2R in traveler’s dilemma games.
and δij(t) are updated according to player i’s experience and applied to the self-tuning EWA
model (fixing λ) to determine updated attractions according to the EWA rule. The updated
attractions produce predicted probabilities P
si(t)
i (t|λ). Using the first 70% of the subjects in
each game, we determine the value of λ that maximizes the total likelihood over the 70% of the
subjects. Then the value of λ is frozen and used to forecast behavior of the entire path of the
remaining 30% of the subjects.14 Payoﬀs were converted to inflation-adjusted dollars (which
is important for cross-game forecasting) and scaled by subtracting the lowest possible payoﬀs.
Randomized bootstrap resampling is used to calculate parameter standard errors.
In addition to self-tuning EWA, we estimated both the parametric EWA model and the one-
parameter quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model. QRE is a static no-learning benchmark,
which is tougher competition than Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Model fit and predictive accuracy
The first question to address is how well models fit and predict on a game-by-game basis (i.e.,
when EWA parameters are estimated separately for each game). As noted, to limit over-
fitting we estimate parameters using 70% of the subjects (in-sample calibration) and use those
estimates to predict choices by the remaining 30% (out-of-sample validation). For in-sample
estimation we report a Bayesian information criterion (BIC) which subtracts a penalty k·ln(NT )2
from the L(λ) value. For out-of-sample validation we report the log-likelihood (L(λ)) on the
hold-out sample of 30% of the subjects.
Table 2 shows the results. The Table also show the choice probability implied by the
average likelihood15 compared to the probability if choices were random. Across games, self-
tuning EWA predicts a little worse than EWA in out-of-sample prediction, though generally
more accurately than QRE. This is not surprising since the parametric EWA model uses four
extra free parameters (δ,φ, κ and N(0)) in each game. The correlation between the φ function
of self-tuning and the φ estimates of EWA is 0.77 and the corresponding correlation for the δ
is 0.52.16 However, self-tuning EWA is better in the pooled estimation where a common set
14We also tried using the first 70% of the observations from each subject, then forecasted the last 30%. The
results are similar.
15That is, divide the total log likelihood by the number of subject-periods. Exponentiating this number gives
the geometric mean (“average”) predicted probability of the strategies that are actually played.
16The parameter estimates are reported in Table A.1.
of parameters (except λ, which is always game-specific) was used for EWA. QRE fits worst in
both individual games and pooled estimation, which is no surprise because it does not allow
learning.
A more challenging robustness test is to estimate all parameters on six of the seven games,
then use those parameters to predict choices in the remaining seventh game for all subjects.
This is done for each of the seven games, one at a time. Cross-game prediction has been used
by others but only within similar games in a class (2x2 games with mixed equilibria, Erev and
Roth, 1998; and 5x5 symmetric games, Stahl, forthcoming). Our results test whether fitting
a model on a coordination game, say, can predict behavior in a game with mixed equilibrium.
This is the most ambitious use of learning models across games since Roth and Erev (1995)
who demonstrated the importance of this kind of cross-game forecasting.
Table 3 reports results from the cross-game prediction. By this measure, self-tuning EWA
has the highest cross-game likelihood in three games; EWA is highest in four other games. QRE
is the least accurate in six out of the seven games.
Likelihood values summarize the model fit over time, strategies and subjects; but they do not
allow one to gauge how model fit changes over time and across strategies. To get a more nuanced
feel for the fit between data and models, the next section produces graphs using predicted and
relative frequencies for three games which are exemplars of three classes: The patent race game
has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, the continental divide coordination game has multiple
Pareto-ranked pure equilibria, and the beauty contest games are dominance-solvable.17
3.3 Games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium: Patent races
In the patent race game two players, one strong and one weak, are endowed with resources and
compete in a patent race. The strong player has an endowment of 5 units and the weak player
has an endowment of 4 units (Rapoport and Amaldoss, 2000). They simultaneously invest
an integer amount up to their endowments, istrong and iweak. The player whose investment is
strictly larger earns 10 minus their investment. A player whose investment is less than or equal
to the other player’s investment earns no payoﬀ, and ends up with their endowment minus the
investment.
17Corresponding graphs for all games can be seen at http://www.bschool.nus.edu.sg /depart/mk /bizcjk
/fewa.htm so readers can draw their own conclusions about other games.
The game has an interesting strategic structure. The strong player can guarantee a payoﬀ of
five by investing the entire endowment istrong = 5 (out-spending the weak player), which strictly
dominates investing zero (istrong = 0). Eliminating the strong player’s dominated strategy
istrong = 0 then makes iweak = 1 a dominated strategy for the weak player (since she can never
win by investing one unit). Iterating in this way, the strong player deletes istrong ∈ {0, 2, 4} and
the weak player deletes iweak ∈ {1, 3} by iterated application of strict dominance. The result is
a unique mixed equilibrium in which strong players invest five 60% of the time and play their
other two (serially) undominated strategies of investing one and three 20% of the time, and
weak players invest zero 60% of the time and invest either two or four 20% of the time.
Thirty six pairs of subjects played the game in a random matching protocol 160 times
(with the role switched after 80 rounds); the 36 pairs are divided into 2 groups where random
matching occurs within group. Since overall choice frequencies do not change visibly across
time, and are rather close to equilibrium predictions, our plots show frequencies of transitions
between period t−1 and period t strategies to focus on changes across time. Figures 1a-d show
the empirical transition matrix and predicted transition frequencies across the five strategies
(istrong ∈ {0, 1, · · · 5}) for strong players, using the within-game estimation and pooling across
all subjects. (Weak-player results are similar.)
The key features of the data are the high percentage of transitions from 5 to 5, almost
40%, and roughly equal numbers of transitions (about 5%) from 1 to 1, and from 1 to 5 or
vice versa. The figures show that QRE does not predict diﬀerences in transitions at all. The
challenge for explaining transitions is that after investing istrong = 5, about 80% of the time the
strong player knows that the weak player invested only 0 or 2. Most learning models predict
that strong players should therefore invest less, but the figures show that about half the time
the strong players invest 5 again. The self-tuning and parametric EWA models explain the
relatively low rate of downward transitions by multiplying the high foregone payoﬀs, in the case
where the strong player invested 5 and the weak player invested nothing or two, by a relatively
low value of δ. This means the attractions for low istrong are not updated as much as the chosen
strategy istrong = 5, which explains the persistence of investing and the low rate of switching.
The low value of δ, which is estimated to be .30 in EWA and averages .16 in self-tuning EWA,
is one way of expressing why strong players are sluggish in switching down from istrong = 5.
3.4 Games with multiple pure strategy equilibria: Continental divide game
Van Huyck et al. (1997) studied a coordination game with multiple equilibria and extreme
sensitivity to initial conditions, which we call the continental divide game (CDG).
Subjects play in cohorts of seven people. Subjects choose an integer from 1 to 14, and their
payoﬀ depends on their own choice and on the median choice of all seven players. The payoﬀ
matrix is constructed so that there are two pure equilibria (at 3 and 12) which are Pareto-
ranked (12 pays $1.12 and 3 pays $.60). The best-response correspondence bifurcates in the
middle: For all M ≤ 7, the best response to a median M is strictly between M and 3. For high
medians M ≥ 8, the best response is strictly between M and 12. The payoﬀ at 3 is about half
as much as at 12. This game captures the possibility of extreme sensitivity to initial conditions
(or path-dependence).
Their experiment used 10 cohorts of seven subjects each, playing for 15 periods. At the end
of each period subjects learned the median, and played again with the same group in a partner
protocol.
Figures 2a-d show empirical frequencies (pooling all subjects) and model predictions. The
key features of the data are: Bifurcation over time from choices in the middle of the range
(5-10) to the extremes, near the equilibria at 3 and 12; and late-period choices are more sharply
clustered around 12 than around 3. (Figure 2a hides strong path-dependence: Groups which had
first-period M ≤ 7 (M ≥ 8) always converged toward the low (high) equilibrium.) Notice also
that strategies 1-4 are never chosen in early periods, but are frequently chosen in later periods;
and oppositely, strategies 7-9 are frequently chosen in early periods but never chosen in later
periods. A good model should be able to capture these subtle eﬀects by ”accelerating” low
choices quickly (going from zero to frequent choices in a few periods) and ”braking” midrange
choices quickly (going from frequent 7-9 choices to zero).
QRE fits poorly because it predicts no movement. Self-tuning EWA and parametric EWA
are fairly accurate and able to explain the key features of the data— viz., convergence toward the
two equilibria, sharper convergence around 12 than around 3, and rapid increase in strategies
1-4 and extinction of 7-9. Both this game and the game above show how self-tuning EWA is
able to reproduce the predictive power of EWA without having to estimate parameters.
3.5 Games with dominance-solvable pure strategy equilibrium: p-Beauty
Contests
In the p-beauty contests of Ho et al. (1998), seven players simultaneously choose numbers in
[0,100]. The player whose number is closest to a known fraction (either 0.7 or 0.9) of the group
average wins a fixed prize. Their experiment also manipulated experience of subjects because
half of them played a similar game before. Initial choices are widely dispersed and centered
around 45. When the game is repeated, numbers gradually converge toward the equilibrium 0
and experienced subjects converge much faster towards equilibrium.
Figures 3a-f show empirical frequencies and model predictions of self-tuning EWA and EWA
broken down by experience of subjects. (As in the earlier plots, QRE fits badly so it is omitted.)
Self-tuning EWA tracks behavior about as accurately as EWA for inexperienced subjects, and
is substantially more accurate for experienced subjects. The cross-game EWA estimate of φ
used is 0.83, which is significantly higher than the in-game estimate φ of 0.31. The cross-
game estimate of δ used is 0.29, lower than the in-game estimate δ of 0.70. These cross-game
values create the sluggishness in responding to surprises (φ is too high) and to the many better
strategies available (δ is too low).
The average self-tuning function φi(t) is 0.58, which is relatively more responsive to surprises
than the 0.83 cross-game estimate. Coupled with the δij(t) function, which by definition is
totally responsive to better strategies, this helps to explain why self-tuning EWA predicts
behavior better. The sluggish response to surprise of EWA also explains why EWA is less
accurate than its self-tuning cousin in experienced session; experienced subjects create more
surprises than their inexperienced counterparts as they move faster to convergence.
4 Economic Value of Models
Most criteria used to judge fit and predictive accuracy of models are purely statistical, or are
roughly equivalent to familiar statistics. But economic applications of theories call for a financial
measure of what good theories are worth. In this section we define a theory’s economic value as
the increase in an average subject’s profit from substituting learning theory recommendations—
i.e., best responses based on the theory’s prediction about what others will do— for actual
choices.
To define the economic value of a learning theory formally, we need to start with some
notation. Denote the aggregate choice frequency of strategy sk−i of the potential pool of player
i’s opponents in round t by fk(t). Player i’s expected ex-ante payoﬀ of choosing si(t), given the
ex-post frequencies of strategy choices fk(t), is E(πi(si(t)) =
Pm−i
k=1 fk(t) · πi(si(t), sk−i).
To measure economic value, use the estimated model parameters from the previous section
(out-of-game estimates) and a player’s observed experience through period t to generate model
predictions about what others will do in t + 1. That prediction is a probability distribution
over choices by others. Optimizing using this predicted distribution produces a choice with the
highest expected value. A model x that prescribes an action si(t|x) receives an actual payoﬀ
of πi(si(t|x), s−i(t)) and has an expected payoﬀ, with random matching across the population,
of vx(t) ≡ E(πi(si(t|x) =PKk=1 fk(t) · πi(si(t|x), sk−i). Since the typical player earns v(si(t)) ≡P
si(t)E(πi(si(t)), the added economic value from model x is ∆EV (x) =
P
t vx(t)− v(si(t)).
A reasonable benchmark is where players guess accurately the distribution of opponents’
plays in the population (i.e., they know fk(t)) but do not know exactly what the opponent
they are paired with will do. Then their optimal strategy is si(t|RE) = argmaxj
PK
k=1 f
k(t) ·
πi(s
j
i , s
k
−i). This “rational expectations” benchmark yields an expected payoﬀ of vRE(t) ≡
E(πi(si(t|RE)) =PKk=1 fk(t) · πi(si(t|RE), sk−i).
A common misconception about the economic value of learning models is that a good learn-
ing model will necessarily have little economic value, because if it captures learning then players
will anticipate it and reduces its value. This misconception assumes players are “sophisticated”
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1991)— i.e., players understand how others learn. If players are learning
from experience, but are unsophisticated about the possibility that others are learning, then
using the learning rule can have economic value. Put simply, if players learn according to a pre-
dictable rule, they must not be sophisticated. Put diﬀerently, if players are sophisticated about
learning of others, then a sophisticated learning model (as in Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002, or
Stahl, 1999) will not have economic value. So if a learning model has economic value compared
to the average player, the model’s economic value is evidence of the degree of unsophistication
of players.
In estimating the economic value of learning models, there is a potential subtle “boomerang”
eﬀect of current choices on future value (a la the Lucas critique in macroeconomic models).
Consider a game like the “traveller’s dilemma” (Capra et al., 1999) which we rename a game
of price-matching with loyalty. In this game two players choose prices p1, p2 from the interval
[80, 120]. Call the low price plow ≡ min(p1, p2). The low-price player earns plow + R and the
high-price player earns plow − R; the value R represents a reward to the low-price firm and a
penalty for the high-price firm (if the players name the same price both earn plow).
A player who uses a good learning model to forecast accurately how other players will
behave generally undercuts prices. As a result, the economic value from the learning model in
a particular period is usually positive. However, choosing a low undercutting price in period
t may lead other players to choose even lower prices in period t + 1, which lowers the future
value of the player who undercut price in t. Thus, in evaluating a model’s economic value,
it is important to account for the eﬀects of a current decision on future payoﬀs. Note that if
there are many subjects in a random-matching protocol, this boomerang eﬀect will be minimal
because one player’s period t choice will not aﬀect future earnings much (since a player will not
face his period t opponent again). Furthermore, the boomerang eﬀect can be positive (e.g., in
coordination games, where a player who forecasts accurately speeds up the rate of mutually-
beneficial coordination). The Appendix describes how we carefully account for boomerang
eﬀects.18
Table 4 shows the economic value of self-tuning EWA, parametric EWA, QRE, weighted
fictitious play belief learning (Fudenberg and Levine, 1988), and an average reinforcement model
with adjustment for payoﬀ variation (Erev and Roth, 1998). The table reports the percentage
improvement (inclusive of boomerang eﬀects) of each model over the actual payoﬀ. Only self-
tuning and EWA consistently add positive value. Self-tuning EWA model adds the most value
in four out of seven games. Interestingly, belief learning, reinforcement and QRE models have
negative value in two to three of the seven games, implying that subjects’ beliefs are more
accurate than forecasts implied in these models in these three games.
18An even better test is to have human subjects compete with computerized learners, who continually update
their forecasts based on a particular learning model (e.g., self-tuning EWA with a prespecified value of λ). Then
the economic value of the computerized players’ learning rule is easily calculated as how much more (or less)
the computerized players earn, compared to the average human subject. Computerizing learning-rule players is
nontrivial since it requires players to receive feedback and continually update learning rules in real-time. It lies
naturally beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusion
Learning is clearly important for economics. Equilibrium theories are useful because they
suggest a possible limit point of a learning process and permit comparative static analysis. But
if learning is slow, or the time path of behavior selects one equilibrium out of many, a precise
theory of equilibration is crucial for knowing which equilibrium will result, and how quickly.
The theory described in this paper, self-tuning EWA, replaces the key parameters in the
EWA learning models with functions that change over time in response to experience. One
function is a “change detector” φ which goes up (limited by one) when behavior by other
players is stable, and dips down (limited by zero) when there is surprising new behavior by
others. When φ dips down, the eﬀects of old experience (summarized in attractions which
cumulate or average previous payoﬀs) is diminished by decaying the old attraction by a lot.
The second “attention” function δ is one for strategies that yield better than actual payoﬀ
and zero otherwise. This function ties sensitivity to foregone payoﬀs to attention, which is
likely to be on strategies that give better than actual payoﬀ ex post. Self-tuning EWA is more
parsimonious than most learning theories because it has only one free parameter— the response
sensitivity λ.
We report fit and prediction of data from seven experimental games using self-tuning EWA,
the parameterized EWA model, and quantal response equilibrium (QRE). Both QRE and self-
tuning EWA have one free parameter, and EWA has five. We report both in-sample fit (penal-
izing more complex theories using the Bayesian information criterion) and out-of-sample as well
as out-of-game predictive accuracy, to be sure that many complex models do not necessarily fit
better.
There are three key results.
First, self-tuning EWA fits and predicts slightly worse than EWA in all seven games; and it
produces a functional parameter values for φ and δ which roughly track the estimated values of
fixed parameters across games. Self-tuning EWA therefore represents one solution to the central
problem of flexibly generating EWA-like parameters across games. Because self-tuning EWA
generates sensible cross-game parameter variation automatically, it fits and predicts better than
other models when games are pooled and common parameters are estimated.
Second, we propose a new criterion for judging the usefulness of theories, called economic
value. A theory’s economic value is the incremental profit a subject would earn from following
the theory’s advice rather than making their own choices. Most learning models add economic
value at least in some games. Self-tuning EWA add the most economic value in a majority of
games. Similar conclusions are drawn when boomerang and Lucas-critique eﬀects are carefully
controlled by a new statistical methodology.
Third, the functions in self-tuning EWA are robust across games. This paper added three
brand new games (after the first version was written and circulated) to test robustness. The
basic conclusions are replicated in these games, which have incomplete information and choices
are made by groups rather than individuals (see our working paper).
A next step in this research is to find some axiomatic underpinnings for the functions.
Extending the φ function to exploit information about ordered strategies might prove useful.
And since self-tuning EWA is so parsimonious, it is useful as a building block for extending
learning theories to include sophistication (players anticipating that others are learning; see
Stahl, 1999) and explain “teaching” behavior in repeated games (Camerer, Ho and Chong
2002; Cooper and Kagel, 2001).
The theory is developed to fit experimental data, but the bigger scientific payoﬀ will come
from application to naturally-occurring situations. If learning is slow, a precise theory of eco-
nomic equilibration is just as useful for predicting what happens in the economy as a theory
of equilibrium. For example, institutions for matching medical residents and medical schools,
and analogous matching in college sororities and college bowl games, developed over decades
(Roth and Xing, 1994). Bidders in eBay auctions learn to bid late to hide their information
about an object’s common value (Bajari and Hortacsu, 1999). Consumers learn over time what
products they like (Ho and Chong, 2003). Learning in financial markets can generate excess
volatility and returns predictability, which are otherwise anomalous in rational expectations
models (Timmerman, 1993). Sargent (1999) argues that learning by policymakers about ex-
pectational Phillips’ curves and the public’s perceptions of inflation explains macroeconomic
behavior in the last couple of decades. Good theories of learning should be able to explain these
patterns and help predict how new institutions will evolve, how rapidly bidders learn to wait,
and which new products will succeed. Applying self-tuning EWA, and other learning theories,
to field domains is therefore an important goal of future research.
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6 Appendix: Adjusting for boomerang eﬀects in computing
economic value
The procedure described in section 4 allows us to estimate how much subjects would have
earned if they were to adopt a model’s prescription. The procedure works if subjects play the
game once and their choices have no future ramifications (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003, 2004).
The procedure has two potential problems (a la Lucas’s critique) if the game is repeated.
First, if player i were to follow a model’s prescription in period t, then her opponent would
have changed his actions in future rounds creating a boomerang eﬀect that could have changed
the evolution of plays (i.e., fk(τ),∀τ > t would have changed). We call this “cross-sectional
boomerang eﬀect”.
Second, the adoption of a model’s prescription in period t could have influenced the player’s
payoﬀs from period t+1 to T . For instance, following a model’s recommendation could help the
player in the immediate round but hurt her in future rounds because it leads to a pareto inferior
outcome (e.g., a lower number in traveller’s dilemma). We call this “longitudinal boomerang
eﬀect”. Consequently, it is possible that a subject who adopted a theory’s recommendation
would make choices that would reduce long-run payoﬀs.
It is possible to control for these boomerang eﬀects statistically. First we divide actual
subject choices into those that are consistent with a theory’s recommendation and those that
are not, and see which choices earn more. If the advice is good, the subjects who “coincidentally”
followed the advice should earn more and this should control for “cross-sectional boomerang
eﬀect”.
The “longitudinal boomerang eﬀect” is controlled by estimating both current and future
ramifications of a theory’s recommendation so that its overall economic impact can be assessed.
We describe how this can be done next.
Let’s consider the following set of simple regression equations:
πi(t) = α0,t + α1,t · I(si(t), si(t|x)), t = 1, . . . , T (6.1)
where I(si(t), si(t|x)) is an indicator function and is equal to 1 if si(t) = si(t|x) and 0 otherwise.
A model x adds positive economic value iﬀ
PT
t=1 α1,t > 0. The parameters α1,t(t = 1, . . . , T )
control for cross-sectional boomerang eﬀect because they are derived based on diﬀerences in
the performance of choices that are consistent with the model’s prescription and those that are
not. Since subjects do not change their choices as a result of the model’s prescription, there is
no cross-sectional boomerang eﬀect.
The above set of equations however does not control for longitudinal boomerang eﬀect.
Consequently, the economic value of a model in period t, α1,t, can be biased in two ways.
Except for α1,1, α1,t might include longitudinal boomerang eﬀect from following the model’s
prescriptions from period 1 to t − 1. In addition, α1t (except for α1,T ) does not include the
economic value of following the model’s period t recommendation in periods t+1 and beyond.
The following set of multiple regressions will fix both problems:
πi(t) = α0,t +
tX
τ=1
ατ,t · I(si(τ), si(τ |x)), t = 1, . . . , T (6.2)
This set of equations regresses players’ period t payoﬀs with whether or not their choices
are consistent with the model’s prescriptions from period 1 to t. ατ,t captures the increase in
payoﬀ in period t by adopting the model’s prescription in period τ < t. The average economic
value of a model’s period t prescription is:
αt =
TX
τ=t
αt,τ (6.3)
Note that α1 has T terms (α1,1 + α1,2 + . . . ,+α1,T ), αT has one term (αT,T ), and αt in
general has T − t + 1 terms. Hence, learning theories can be ranked by the following overall
economic value:
∆EV (x) =
TX
τ=1
(1− f(t|x))αt (6.4)
where f(t|x) is the ex-post frequency of strategic choices in period t that are consistent with
model x. The economic values are adjusted for instances where strategic choices are consistent
with the model where no additional value is generated. This overall economic value can be
broken into the current period eﬀect (
PT
τ=1(1 − f(t|x))ατ,τ ) and the boomerang eﬀect ((1 −
f(t|x)) · (PTτ=1 αt −PTτ=1 ατ,τ )).
Note that the regressions look backward, using the historical coeﬃcients ατ,t of period τ
matching of model predictions with actual choices on period t payoﬀs to measure the eﬀect of
τ choices on future periods t. These coeﬃcients are then used to measure the future eﬀects of
choosing the model-advised choice in period τ on future period payoﬀs. The approach makes
sense because the only way to estimate a model behavior’s future period eﬀects is to look back
from future period payoﬀs to the model behaviors which preceded those payoﬀs. A numerical
example can help make this clear. Consider the continental divide game (Van Huyck et al.,
1997). Table A.2 summarizes choices of 3 subjects in the first 3 periods of a game. The table
also includes the result of the regression analysis to decompose the payoﬀ into current eﬀect
and boomerang eﬀects. For example, in period 3, subject 1 chooses 12 that yields a payoﬀ of
118. This payoﬀ of 118 can be decomposed into α0,3+α1,3+α2,3+α3,3 = 117+0−3+4 where
α1,3 and α2,3 control for boomerang eﬀect from period 1 and 2 respectively. In this example,
the model’s prescription yields an economic value of 9 which consists of 6,−1 and 4 for period
1, 2, and 3 respectively. There is no boomerang eﬀect in period 1 but period 2 has a negative
boomerang eﬀect of -3. In other words, although subjects gains 2 units by following model’s
period 2 description, these subjects actually make 3 units less in period 3.
Table A.3 shows the results of adjusted economic value and its decomposition. Economic value
is positive for many games, which shows that there is some degree of disequilibrium and models
can, in principle, help people make more money. Across the five models, self-tuning EWA
performs the best in three out of the five games. In fact, it is the only model that has positive
economic value in median action and continental divide game. It also adds the most value
in the pot game. These results suggest that self-tuning EWA has a clear edge in enhancing
economic value in coordination games. By this metric, EWA and belief learning perform better
than reinforcement model; both are better than reinforcement model in four out of five games.
QRE is the worst in three out of the five games.
Table 1: A Description of the Seven Games Used in the Estimation of Various Learning Models
Game Number of Number of Number of Pure Number of Number of Matching Experimental Description of Games
Players Strategies Strategy Equilibria Subjects Rounds Protocol Treatment
Mixed Strategies 2 4,6 0 80 40 Fixed Stake Size A constant-sum game with unique mixed
Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997) strategy equilibrium. 
Patent Race 2 5,6 0 36 80 Random Strong vs Weak Strong (weak) player invests between
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) 0 and 5 (0 and 4) and the higher investment
wins a fixed prize.
Continental Divide 7 14 2 70 15 Fixed None A coordination game with two pure strategy 
Van Huyck et al. (1997) equilibria
Median Action 9 7 7 54 10 Fixed None A order-statistic game with individual payoff
Van Huyck et al. (1990) decreases in the distance between individual
choice and the median
Pot Games 3,6,9,18 2 1 84 25 (manual) Fixed Number of Players An entry game where players must decide
Amaldoss and Ho (2001) 28 (computer) which of the two ponds of sizes 2n and n 
they wish to enter. Payoff is the ratio of the pond
size and number of entries.
Price Matching 2 1211 1 52 10 Random Penalty Size Players choose claims between 80 and 200.
(Traveller's Dilemma) Both players get lower claim but the high-claim
Capra et al. (1999) player pays a penalty to the low-claim player.
 
p-Beauty Contest 7 101 1 196 10 Fixed Experienced vs. Inexperienced Players simultaneously choose a number
Ho et al. (1998) from 0 to 100 and the winner whose number is
closet to p (<1) times the group average
Note 1: Continuous strategies of 80 to 200 are discretized to 121 integer strategies
Table 2: Model Fit
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching Pooled 2
Total Sample Size 3200 5760 1050 540 2217 1960 520 15247
In-sample Calibration
Sample Size 2240 4000 735 380 1478 1380 360 10573
BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) 1
Self-tuning EWA -3199 -4367 -1207 -287 -938 -5265 -1408 -16690
EWA -3040 -4399 -1091 -293 -931 -4987 -1103 -16646
QRE -3442 -6686 -1923 -549 -1003 -6254 -1420 -21285
Average Probability
Self-tuning EWA 24.0% 33.6% 19.5% 47.3% 53.1% 2.2% 2.0%
EWA 26.0% 33.5% 23.2% 48.1% 53.9% 2.7% 4.9%
QRE 21.6% 18.8% 7.3% 23.8% 50.8% 1.1% 2.0%
Random 20.4% 18.3% 7.1% 14.3% 50.0% 1.0% 0.8%
Out-of-sample Validation
Sample Size 960 1760 315 160 739 580 160 4674
Log-likelihood
Self-tuning EWA -1406 -1857 -515 -91 -441 -2392 -581 -7315
EWA -1342 -1876 -482 -89 -433 -2203 -532 -7377
QRE -1441 -3006 -829 -203 -486 -2667 -607 -9240
Note 1: BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) is given by LL - (k/2)*log(N*T) where k is the number of parameters, N is the number of subjects and T is the number of periods.
Note 2: A common set of parameters, except game-specific λ, is estimated for all games. Each game is given equal weight in LL estimation.
Table 3: Out-of-sample Prediction Using Out-game Estimates
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching
Total Sample Size 3200 5760 1050 540 2217 1960 520
Log-likelihood
Self-tuning EWA -4618 -7074 -1720 -385 -1398 -8468 -2179
EWA -4733 -6321 -1839 -457 -1365 -7806 -2140
QRE -4667 -9132 -2758 -957 -1533 -8911 -2413
Average Probability
Self-tuning EWA 23.6% 29.3% 19.4% 49.0% 53.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Random 20.4% 18.3% 7.1% 14.3% 50.0% 1.0% 0.8%
Table 4: Economic Value
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide 2 Action 2 Games Contest 2 Matching
Actual Payoff 1560 2657 872 432 304 519 192
Economic Value Achieved as a Percetage of Actual Payoff 1 
%V(Rational Expectation) 17.7% 47.9% 1.9% 0.9% 35.9% 585.4% 19.3%
%V(Self-tuning EWA) 11.8% 3.8% 1.4% 0.7% 6.9% 53.6% 15.5%
%V(EWA) 3.9% 5.0% 0.8% 0.5% 4.7% 49.8% 15.2%
%V(Belief Based) 5.5% 1.4% -0.7% -0.5% 3.4% 48.9% 13.9%
%V(Reinforcement) 11.9% 5.0% -5.2% -0.1% 7.3% -27.6% 9.7%
%V(QRE) 2.5% 1.3% -8.6% -0.5% 8.1% -60.2% 12.0%
Note 1: We assume that each bionic subject use the respective model to predict other's behavior 
and best responds with the strategy that yields the highest expected payoff.
Note 2: The expected value of each strategy in these games is computed with 1000 simulated instances 
for a given round due to high computational burden for actual derivation.
Table A.1: Parameter Estimates
Mixed Patent Continental Median Pot p-Beauty Price
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching Pooled
Self-tuning EWA
φ  function 0.89 0.89 0.69 0.85 0.80 0.58 0.63 0.76
δ  function 0.09 0.16 0.44 0.18 0.23 0.34 0.29 0.25
λ 3.98 9.24 4.43 5.30 7.34 2.39 10.20 5.86
EWA
φ 0.97 0.91 0.72 0.73 0.86 0.31 0.80 0.79
δ 0.19 0.30 0.90 0.94 0.00 0.70 0.40 0.41
κ 0.82 0.15 0.77 0.99 0.92 0.91 0.80 0.28
Ν0 0.67 0.73 0.36 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.39 0.77
λ 0.34 4.27 13.83 18.55 1.61 2.57 9.88 6.33
QRE
λ 1.12 0.81 1.83 28.45 3.37 0.69 29.83 9.44
Table A.2: An Example of Economic Value Decomposition
Period, t 1 2 3
Median Outcome, s-i(t) 8 10 13
Model Choice, si(t|x) 10 11 12
Subject 1
Subject Choice, s1(t) 10 11 12
Actual Payoff, π[s1(t) s-1(t)] 89 100 118
Subject 2
Subject Choice, s2(t) 10 10 13
Actual Payoff, π[s2(t) s-2(t)] 89 98 117
Subject 3
Subject Choice, s3(t) 10 11 11
Actual Payoff, π[s3(t) s-3(t)] 89 100 114
ατ,t  t=1 t=2 t=3 ατ  
τ=0 83 98 117
τ=1 6 0 0 6
τ=2 2 -3 -1
τ=3 4 4
Table A.3: Economic Value - Current Period and Boomerang Effects 
Mixed 1 Patent 1 Continental Median Pot p-Beauty 2 Price 2 
Data Set Strategies Race Divide Action Games Contest Matching
Actual Payoff 1560 2657 872 432 304 519 192
Number of Subjects 80 36 70 54 84 196 52
Total Economic Value (As % of Observed Payoff)
%V(Rational Expectation) 37.8% -11.0% 4.3% 0.2% 114.3% - -
%V(Self-tuning EWA) 23.8% 13.7% 4.2% 0.5% 36.2% - -
%V(EWA) 28.6% 8.6% -1.4% -0.5% 15.6% - -
%V(Belief Based) 36.1% 20.1% -10.7% -1.3% 22.2% - -
%V(Reinforcement) 24.1% 7.6% -17.0% -1.2% 21.9% - -
%V(QRE) 2.2% 19.9% -24.0% -1.3% 24.8% - -
Current Period Effect
%V(Rational Expectation) 16.8% 10.0% 2.5% 0.5% 52.1% - -
%V(Self-tuning EWA) 13.6% 3.9% 2.4% 0.5% 12.6% - -
%V(EWA) 9.3% 3.4% 1.1% 0.4% 10.9% - -
%V(Belief Based) 12.1% 4.0% -2.9% -1.1% 9.6% - -
%V(Reinforcement) 9.6% 3.3% -4.8% -0.4% 12.8% - -
%V(QRE) 7.3% 4.0% -6.5% -1.4% 15.0% - -
Boomerang Effect
%V(Rational Expectation) 21.0% -21.0% 1.7% -0.2% 62.2% - -
%V(Self-tuning EWA) 10.2% 9.8% 1.8% 0.0% 23.7% - -
%V(EWA) 19.3% 5.2% -2.5% -0.8% 4.7% - -
%V(Belief Based) 24.1% 16.2% -7.8% -0.2% 12.6% - -
%V(Reinforcement) 14.6% 4.3% -12.2% -0.9% 9.1% - -
%V(QRE) -5.1% 15.9% -17.5% 0.0% 9.7% - -
Note 1: For these 2 datasets, due to the fact that there are more rounds than subjects, instead of 
regressing for all T rounds, we only regress on the next/last 10 and 20 rounds respectively for mixed 
strategies and patent race
Note 2: The number of strategic choices consistent with model recommendation is less than 10% of 
total observations. Hence, we do not perform the same analysis for this game.
Figure 1 Transition Matrices for Patent Race
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Figure 1a: Empirical Transition
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Figure 1b: Self-tuning EWA
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Figure 1c: Parametric EWA
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Figure 1d: Quantal Response Equilibrium
Figure 2: Empirical Frequency and Model Predictions for Continental Divide
1
3
5
7
9
1
1
1
3
1
5
S1
S4
S7
S10
S13 0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
Prob
PeriodStrategy
Figure 2a: Empirical Frequency
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Figure 2b: Self-tuning EWA
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Figure 2c: Parametric EWA 
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Figure 2d: Quantal Response Equilibrium
Figure 3: Empirical Frequency and Model Predictions for p-Beauty Contest
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Figure 3a: Empirical Frequency (Experienced Subject)
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Figure 3d: Empirical Frequency (Inexperienced Subject)
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Figure 3b: Self-tuning EWA (Experienced Subject)
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Figure 3e: Self-tuning EWA (inexperienced Subject)
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Figure 3c: Adaptive EWA (Experienced Subject)
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Figure 3f: Adaptive EWA (Inexperienced Subject)
